There are only Three Jurisdictions
-- and No More
Part Four of the British System
All three of
these jurisdictions have cognizance over civil matters, as
contradistinguished from criminal matters, depending on the
subject matter in controversy and nature of the cause.
If, it is an action at Common Law properly brought into a
common law court, the court is bound by the principles, rules
and procedures of Common Law. If the action is properly
brought before an Equity or Admiralty court, the court is
bound by the principles, rules and procedures of the civil
law dealing with the subject matter.
Equity has no cognizance over criminal matters and,
therefore, in criminal cases there are only two jurisdictions
-- every criminal case must be prosecuted either in the
jurisdiction of Common Law, or that of the Law of Admiralty.
In criminal cases, Common Law courts are bound by the
principles, rules and procedures of the Common Law. In
Admiralty cases, the court is bound by the principles, rules
and procedures of Admiralty and Maritime Law.
You will see, subsequently, that State courts have
concurrent jurisdiction in both Common Law and Maritime law
concerning certain types of cases and subject matter. You also
will see that in these cases, if the subject matter or nature
of this cause is Maritime that, even if it is heard in a
Common Law court, that court is bound to apply the Maritime
Law to the case. We also will show that no Admiralty court in
the land as any jurisdiction to hear Common Law issues.
Briefly, here are some distinctive differences between the
principles, rules and procedures of common law and civil law:
Common Law
- Right to trial by jury
- 12 judges -- the jury
- 12 judges:
control the trial
judge justice of law
determine admissibility of evidence
apply law to facts
render verdict according to conscience
Civil Law
- No right to trial by jury
- ONE judge (chancelor)
- One chancelor controls trial:
jury is advisory to chancelor
chancelor determines admissibility of evidence
jury must accept the law as given by chancelor
jury renders verdict according to law dictated
and evidence presented
The Supreme Court analysed these two sections of the
judiciary act in the Huntress case in 1840: The Huntress case
was a libel in personam against the owners of the steamship
Huntress. The Court said: "In these, and in analogous cases,
the only question that can be considered as an open one is,
whether they come within that clause of the Constitution that
says, the judicial power of the United States shall extend to
"all causes of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction." If they
do, then the original cognizance of them is by the ninth
section of the Judiciary Act, given to the district court". .
. . "The argument, that this clause is controlled by the
Seventh Amendment, which secures the right of trial by jury in
all suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy exceeds
twenty dollars, has no application to the constitutional grant;
because these are not suits at Common Law";
And, in the DeLovio vs. Boit case, Justice Story said: "And,
the ground is made stronger by the consideration, that the
right of trial by jury is preserved by the constitution in all
suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds
twenty dollars; and by the statute this right is excluded in
all cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction." Here we
have a clear statement, by the Supreme Court that there is no
access to Common Law in courts of Admiralty.
In 1832, the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania
very ably addressed the meaning and intent of the 7th amendment
in the case of Bains v. The Schooner James and Catherine, as
follows: ". . . by attempting to introduce the admiralty
jurisdiction of the civil law, . . . a foundation is laid for
interminable conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts of
the State and the Union." "It is vain to contend that the
Seventh Amendment will be any efficient guarantee for the
right, in suits at Common law, if an Admiralty jurisdiction
exists in the United States, commensurate with what is claimed
by the claimant in this case. Its assertion is, in my opinion,
a renewal of the contest between legislative power and royal
prerogative, the Common and the Civil Law, striving for
mastery; the one to secure, the other to take away the trial
by jury, . . . judicial power must first annul the Seventh
Amendment, or judicial subtly transform a suit at Common Law,
into a case of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction, before I
take cognizance as such a case as this without a jury."
Thus, Admiralty is Civil Law, and, once again, Common Law
is not accessible in courts of Admiralty -- and, as J. Reuben
Clark said: there is a constant ideological conflict between
Civil and Common Law for the control of society.
In the preface to his book "Honest Money", Dr.
Norburn wrote: "What a marvellous country was this new world
-- AMERICA. Its coastline, dotted with deep harbors, seemed
endless. It had great mountains and great rivers. There were
magnificent forests and vast fertile plains. Its earth was
rich with minerals. Those who came to live in this veritable
paradise were of sturdy stock. They were industrious, saving
and ingenious. They had the best government ever devised. How
does it happen that now, after more than three hundred years
of intense toil, the inhabitants of this nation find themselves
more than ten trillion dollars in debt? They have received no
benefits to justify this debt. To whom do they owe it? How
were the claims acquired?
As you will see, the factual answers to Dr. Norburn's
questions, and proper application of the appropriate law to
these facts, provide us the necessary fact and law to build a
winning case that can restore our access to Common Law; and
can restore our allodial land titles.
Introduction of the George Rapp
Society:
First Successful communistic, religious,
organization in the United States.
The society was designed for profit
making (for some) and its formula included a controlled
economy under limited liability, which, as you will see before
this rresentation is over, are the same ingredients of the
Federal Reserve formula that is running this country today!
This is the formula that brought admiralty inland and has
barred our access to substantive Common Law.
George Rapp Harmony Society -- 1805 (Re: Schriber v. Rapp,
Pa. Supreme Court, 351) George Rapp founded the "Harmony
Society" in 1805, at Harmony, in Beaver County, Pa.,
subsequently moved to Harmony on the Wabash, in the state of
Indiana, and then moved to "Economy" in Beaver County, Pa.
The nature of this society was brought to light in the case of
Schriber v. Rapp in 1836. This case was an action of account
brought by Jacob Schriber, administrator of Peter Schriber,
deceased, against George Rapp and others, doing business in
company under the name of Harmony Society. To sustain the
action, the plaintiff proved by testimony that the Harmony
Society possessed a great deal of wealth in the form of
personal property, real property, factories, etc. It was a
pool of property.
Witness, Dr. Smith, once a member of the association
stated: "They intended to make money when they entered into
it; it was a part of their object. I believe there were
Articles at Harmony, but everyone was not obliged to sign it.
Equal rights, equal enjoyments and equal profits. Rapp said
it should not be incorporated, for that would take too much
power from him. Rapp was not elected. He assumed the power
that Moses and Aaron had. If anyone would not do what he said,
he would say, `What have you to do about it? I have the power
-- I could crush you. All you have to do is obey.' He got
worse as he got wealthy."
George Rapp was a preacher -- and a very persuasive one.
Adam Shelly testified on behalf of the plaintiff respecting
the first articles of association on the Wabash. "The people
were directed to come in companies, one of them read it and
the rest signed it. As to the article signed at Economy, Rapp
made a long speech. Said any one who would sign it would
have his name written in the Lamb's Book of Life. If they did
not, their names would be blotted out, and God would ask him
about it."
Defendants, to sustain the issue on their part, produced
in evidence the articles of association. Some pertinent
excerpts are as follows:
Article 1: We the undersigned, for ourselves and our heirs,
executors and administrators, do hereby give, grant and
forever convey, to the said George Rapp and his associates,
and their heirs, and assigns, all our property. . . for the
benefit of said association or community.
Article 2: We do further covenant and agree to and with
the said George Rapp and his associates, that we will
severally submit faithfully to the laws and regulations of
said community, . . . therefore holding ourselves bound to
promote the interest and welfare of the said community, not
only by the labor of our own hands, but also by that of our
children, our families and all others who now are or hereafter
may be under our control.
Article 3: . . .that we will never claim or demand either
for ourselves, our children, or for anyone belonging to us,
directly or indirectly, any compensation, wages or reward
whatever, for our, or their labor or services, rendered to
the said community, . . .
Article 5: The said George Rapp and his associates further
agree to supply the undersigned severally with all the
necessaries of life. . . and to such extent as their
circumstances may require.
Article 6: If any of the undersigned. . . should withdraw
from the association, then the said George Rapp and his
associates agree to refund to him or them the value of all
such property without interest, as he or they may have brought
into the community. . . Said value to be refunded. . . as the
said George Rapp and his associates shall determine.
The court ruled for defendant George Rapp on the basis that
"an association for the purpose expressed is prohibited neither
by statute nor the common law." And the court also stated: "It
is supposed, however, that as the intestate had power, by the
articles, to secede from the society and take out whatever he
brought into it, the successor to his personal rights may
exercise it as his representative. Such, however, are not the
terms of the articles. . . The right of accession, therefore,
is intransmissable." The court also stated that "the law knows
no duress by advise and persuasion", and, therefore there was
no fraud in the inducement to sign the article.
In analyzing this case, we see that: 1. The complaint was
brought under the jurisdiction of common law. 2. The plaintiff
lost because of the common law and constitutionally protected
right to contract. 3. Under the common law, the only way to
break the contract was to prove fraud. 4. According to
testimony, the members of the association "intended to make
money when they entered into it."
The witnesses did not explain how they expected to "make
money" under the terms of the contract. The only reasonable
explanation is that they were gambling that they would be
last survivors in the Association -- and share in the
distribution of assets; and/or they expected to benefit from
limited liability by sharing any loses of the association with
the other members. Last survivors take all in a wagering
policy, and mutual sharing of losses is insurance.
In analyzing the George Rapp Association formula, we see:
1. The contract contained a forfeiture clause. (Members
would "never claim compensation;" upon withdrawal, value of
property would be refunded "without interest" -- The right of
accession of property donated to the Association is
intransmissable to heirs of the decedent.
2. Rapp and his associates had no risk as the insurer.
They not only had nothing to lose in the event of death of a
contributor and member -- but gained all property donated with
no possible claim from heirs of the decedent.
3. It was a controlled economy -- under the exclusive
control of George Rapp and his associates.
4. There was no accountability to members of the
Association. . .
You will see, later on, that if Schriber had taken these
facts into an Admiralty court and applied the proper Admiralty
Law to these facts -- he should have won his case.
One additional note on George Rapp --- George Rapp
continued to gain affluence and prestige -- and dignitaries
came from all over the world to his mansion at "Economy" to
marvel at the fantastic success of his society.
Why shouldn't he be successful? By contract, he had slave
labor, donations of untold wealth from members who, if they
chose to withdraw before they died, could only get back the
equivalent of what they had donated without interest; and, if
they died as a member, the property and assets donated
remained in the society as long as it existed.
George Rapp died in 1847; however, the society went on.
Evidence will show that the tremendous wealth accumulated by
this society was subsequently used to fashion a George Rapp
Society on a much larger scale -- with plans to ultimately
encompass the world in a "superstate" controlled and governed
by mercantile interests, under the law of admiralty -- a
superstate wherein all the property in the world, and all the
people on space-ship "Earth", are pledged to the benefit of
this World-wide mercantile association. The "New World Order?
DeLovio v. Bott [1815]:
In 1815, in the case of DeLovio v. Boit, the Supreme Court
ruled the following: [Opinion written by Justice Story]: "The
Admiralty, from the highest antiquity, has exercised a very
extensive criminal jurisdiction, and punished offenses by fine
and imprisonment. The celebrated inquisition at Queensborough,
in the reign of Edward III, would alone be decisive. And, even
at Common Law it had been adjudged, that the Admiralty might
fine for contempt. . . Appeal, and not a Writ of Error, lies
for its decrees. . . Yet, it is conceded on all sides, that
of maritime hypothecations of the Admiralty depends, or ought
to depend, as to contracts upon the subject matter, i.e.
whether maritime or not; and as to torts, upon locality. . .
Neither the Judicial Act nor the Constitution, which it
follows, limit the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the District
Court in any respect to place. It is bounded only by the
nature of the cause over which it is to decide. On the whole,
I am, without the slightest hesitation, ready to pronounce,
that the delegation of cognizance of `all civil cases of
Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction' to the Courts of the
United States comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and
injuries. The latter branch is necessarily bounded by locality;
the former extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may
be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the
stipulation) which relate to the navigation, business or
commerce of the sea.
The next inquiry is, what are properly to be deemed
"maritime contracts." Happily, in this particular there is
little room for controversy. All civilians and jurists agree,
that in this appellation are included, among other things,
marine hypothecations . . .and, what is more material to our
present purpose, policies of insurance. . . My judgement
accordingly is, that policies of insurance are within (though
not exclusively within) the Admiralty and Maritime
jurisdiction of the United States." cmlaw4.htm
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